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Two recent events underline a cognitive challenge for political authorities engaged in stemming the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (1) Apparently, representatives of the United States (U.S.) 
Government have decided not to Issue a visa to the chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission who 
wished to attend a meeting of the American Crystallographic Association in Arlington, Virginia. (2) 
Apparently, representatives of the Iranian Government have successfully tested a medium-range 
ballistic missile capable of reaching an area including Israel, Saudi Arabia, most of Turkey, and a small 
part of Russia. 
 
As to the former event, the rationale seems to entail a punishment for Indian nuclear detonations and 
striving to become a publicly declared nuclear weapons power. Yet does withholding the visa facilitate 
or impede the task of nonproliferation supporters staying abreast of Indian nuclear weapons 
developments? And does withholding the visa facilitate or impede Indian knowledge of science and 
technology that could facilitate Indian nuclear weapons developments? These two questions embrace a 
two by two matrix encompassing four potential maxims about the effects of visa withholding on 
proliferation. 
 
As to the latter event, is the consequence to increase international pressure on Iran to cease from 
further ballistic missile developments? To increase international cooperation with and support for 
Iranian developments through kowtowing towards concurrent increases in Iranian political power? To 
increase international pressure on Iraq to comply with the weapons requirements of United Nations 
resolutions that were conceived at the end of Operation DESERT STORM? To decrease this pressure in 
the face of a legitimate military threat from Iran? These questions are founded on still other maxims 
about the consequences of medium-range ballistic tests on proliferation-related events. 
 
In fact, there are three broad classes of maxims that drive aspects of nonproliferation policy--each 
without valid empirical reliability, validation, and qualification. (1) All political entities--if they possess 
the requisite ability and motivation--should possess nuclear weapons. The total proliferation of nuclear 
assets may ensure the nonproliferation of intent of nuclear weapons employment. In other words, if the 
balance of terror worked for the US and the Soviet Union, why wouldn't it work for all political entities? 
(2) Some political entities--through historical inevitability, prior fact, respectability, or responsibility--
should be allowed to retain nuclear weapons, but not other political entities. This seems to be the de 
facto, most currently operative maxim, even if--according to many of the nuclear "have-nots"--laced 
with arrogance and hypocrisy. After all, one of the "haves" has already employed nuclear weapons on 
two occasions. (3) No political entities should possess nuclear weapons. Negotiations can effect a series 
of unilateral disarmaments or a staggered or concurrent multilateral disarmament. 
 
Various decision-makers embrace one of the three maxims above, sometimes more than one 
concurrently or situationally on the basis, ultimately, of faith bordering on the religious. Does this mean 
that one should embrace instead a strategic-moral relativism? That all maxims are equally helpful and all 
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should have prizes? No. A transcultural position on sanity suggests that different political phenomena--
e.g., withholding a visa or testing a ballistic missile--will have specific consequences in specific situations. 
A guide to predictability may lie in identifying the narrative or drama within which leaders of a political 
entity place themselves--including their respective roles. For nonproliferation supporters to identify 
these narratives and develop and implement narrative changes, however, might require engaging in 
behaviors that are perceived as threatening to the self-perceptions and ideologies of these supporters. 
And for this reason, dysfunctional maxims continue to be reinforced and proliferate. (See Browne, M.W. 
(July 22, 1998). Scientists protest delay in U.S. visa for Indian nuclear physicist. The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimescom; Ezzy, D. (1998). Theorizing narrative identity: Symbolic interactionism and 
hermeneutics. Sociological Quarterly, 39, 239-252; Jayaraman, K.S. (July 23, 1998). Indian atomic chief is 
refused US visa. Nature, http://www.nature.com; Polletta, F. (1998). "It was like a fever…" Narrative and 
identity in social protest. Social Problems, 45, 137-159; Ramsay, J.R. (1998). Postmodern cognitive 
therapy: Cognitions, narratives, and personal meaning-making. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 12, 
39-55; Weiner, T. (July 23, 1998). Iran said to test missile able to hit Israel and Saudis. The New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com.) (Keywords: Atomic Energy Commission, India, Iran, Nonproliferation, 
Nuclear Weapons, United States, Weapons of Mass Destruction, WMD.) 
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